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RISK CLASSIFICATION’S BIG DATA (R)EVOLUTION 
 
RICK SWEDLOFF† 
 
*** 
Insurers can no longer ignore the promise that the algorithms 
driving big data will offer greater predictive accuracy than traditional 
statistical analysis alone.  Big data represents a natural evolutionary 
advancement of insurers trying to price their products to increase their 
profits, mitigate additional moral hazard, and better combat adverse 
selection.  But these big data promises are not free.  Using big data could 
lead to inefficient social and private investments, undermine important 
risk-spreading goals of insurance, and invade policyholder privacy.  These 
dangers are present in any change to risk classification.  Using algorithms 
to classify risk by parsing new and complex data sets raises two additional, 
unique problems.  
First, this machine-driven classification may yield unexpected 
correlations with risk that unintentionally burden suspect or vulnerable 
groups with higher prices.  The higher rates may not reinforce negative 
stereotypes and cause dignitary harms, because the algorithms obscure 
who is being charged more for coverage and for what reason.  
Nonetheless, there may be reasons to be concerned about which groups are 
burdened by having to pay more for coverage.  
Second, big data raises novel privacy concerns.  Insurers 
classifying risk with big data will harvest and use personal information 
indirectly, without asking the policyholders for permission.  This may cause 
certain privacy invasions unanticipated by current regulatory regimes.  
Further, the predictive power of big data may allow insurers to determine 
personally identifiable information about policyholders without asking 
them directly.  
                                                                                                                                
† Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Rutgers Center for Risk and 
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idea. Many thanks also to Jay Feinman and Peter Siegelman for helpful 
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Insurance Conference at the University of Connecticut School of Law and 
supported by the Insurance Law Center. It was also presented to my junior 
colleagues at Rutgers University Law School in both Camden and Newark and at 
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Thus, while big data may be a natural next step in risk 
classification, it may require a revolutionary approach to regulation.  
Regulators are going to have to be more thoughtful about when price 
discrimination matters and what information can be kept private.  The 
former, in particular, will require regulators to determine whether it will 
be acceptable to charge risky groups more for coverage regardless of the 
social context in which those risks materialize.  Further, for both price 
discrimination and privacy issues, regulators will have to increase their 
capacity to analyze the data inputs, algorithms, and outputs of the 
classification schemes. 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Big data is at the insurance industry’s door.  It is frequently in the 
business, popular,1 and academic2 press.  The predictive power of big data 
                                                                                                                                
1 As proof of this claim, just consider the focus and coverage of three of the 
leading popular/business news sources. The New York Times has a blog dedicated just 
to technology issues: Bits: The Business of Technology, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2014). The blog is littered with 
entries about big data. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Google Flu Trends: The Limits of Big 
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2014/03/28/google-
flu-trends-the-limits-of-big-data/. Likewise, the Wall Street Journal has a technology 
blog, Digits: Tech News & Analysis from the WSJ, WALL ST. J., 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2014), and regularly has articles on 
big data. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, ‘Big Data’ Doesn’t Yield Better Loans, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:19 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304732804579425631517880424; Ben DiPietro, Survey 
Roundup: Money Laundering Moves Up Agenda, Big Data Potential, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 28, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/03/28/survey-
roundup-money-laundering-moves-up-agenda-big-data-potential/. Forbes also has 
regular features and blog posts about the impact of big data in the financial sector. See, 
e.g., Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks to Big Data, 
FORBES, Apr. 14, 2014, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2014/03/ 
26/different-customers-different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/.  
2 For a small smattering of just the legal academic articles about big data, 
consider the following titles: Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The 
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); 
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analytics has been touted as game changing for goals as diverse as ending 
poverty, 3  stopping terrorism, 4  and transforming business practices. 5  Its 
evangelists see big data as the most important development since the 
advent of the Internet.  However hyperbolic these claims, there is no doubt 
that this press has had some effect as a wide variety of businesses are using 
or considering how to use big data analytics. 
Despite this, insurers have been slow to adopt big data analytics.6 
There are, however, few industries with as voracious an appetite for data, in 
any form, as the insurance industry.  Carriers likely can no longer ignore 
the possibility that the algorithms driving big data will offer greater 
predictive accuracy than traditional statistical analysis alone.  And, if 
realized, this additional accuracy could potentially benefit insurers in at 
least three ways.7 First, by analyzing purchasing patterns, carriers could 
better target those individuals most likely to buy new coverage and retain 
those insureds most likely to switch to a different carrier.8 Second, insurers 
may be able to use claims and settlement patterns to better distinguish 
                                                                                                                                
Jeffrey Alan Johnson, Senior Research Analyst, Inst’l Research & Info., Utah 
Valley Univ., Address at the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science 
Association: From Open Data to Information Justice (Apr. 13, 2013) (transcript 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241092); Frank Pasquale, Restoring 
Transparency to Automated Justice, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235 
(2011); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013). 
3  WORLD ECON. FORUM, BIG DATA, BIG IMPACT: NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2012), available at http://www.weforum.org/reports/ 
big-data-big-impact-new-possibilities-international-development.  
4 John Arquilla, Small Cells vs. Big Data: Can information Dominance Crush 
Terrorism?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2013/04/22/small_cells_vs_big_data. 
5 Kenneth Neil Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data: 
How It’s Changing the Way We Think About the World, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 
2013, at 28, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139104/kenneth-neil-
cukier-and-viktor-mayer-schoenberger/the-rise-of-big-data. 
6 See Eric Brat, Bos. Consulting Grp., Big Data and Paradigm of Insurance: 
Summary of BCG Recent Research, Presentation at the University of Connecticut 
School of Law Big Data and Insurance Symposium (Apr. 3, 2014). 
7  CHARLES NYCE, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS WHITE PAPER 4 (Am. Inst. for 
CPCU/Ins. Inst. of Am. 2007), available at http://www.theinstitutes.org/ 
doc/predictivemodelingwhitepaper.pdf. 
8 Id. at 4–5. 
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between real and fraudulent claims.9 Third, again, to the extent greater 
predictive power is realized, carriers could use big data analytics to price 
their products more accurately.10 This Article focuses on the implications 
of this third category.  While big data analytics are a natural evolutionary 
step for insurers trying to price their products, the regulatory ramifications 
of this move are potentially revolutionary. 
Insurers set prices by predicting the probability that any group of 
observationally identical individuals will suffer a loss and predicting the 
magnitude of that loss in the insurance period.  Insurers individuate those 
prices by determining whether the particular observable characteristics of a 
particular insured correlate with particular harms. 11 For example, based on 
auto claim data, insurers believe that young men are more likely to be in 
auto accidents and cause more damage than other demographic groups.12 
Therefore, when a twenty-two year-old man purchases auto insurance, he 
pays more than a twenty-two year-old woman for the same coverage.  Big 
data promises new opportunities to fine tune risk classification by using 
algorithms to mine new and complex sets of data to find new correlations 
and make predictions about behavior.  Carriers can gather information 
about insureds from a variety of new sources, including phone records; the 
Internet; health records; sensors in cars and clothing, electrical grids, or 
communication devices.13 In this way, carriers’ use of big data may be a 
natural evolution in risk classification.14 
Insurers are already doing some of this.  For example, carriers have 
asked some drivers to equip their cars with electronic devices that monitor 
their driving patterns.15 Carriers know that drivers who break harder, drive 
                                                                                                                                
9 Id. at 5–7. 
10 Id. at 5. 
11  Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk 
Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403, 408 (1985). 
12 See Jessica Bosari, What Really Goes Into Determining Your Insurance 
Rates?, FORBES (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneywisewomen 
/2013/01/08/what-really-goes-into-determining-your-insurance-rates/; see also JJ 
Arnett, Developmental Sources of Crash Risk in Young Drivers, 8 INJ. 
PREVENTION ii17, ii19 (2002).  
13 See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
14 NYCE, supra note 7, at 5. 
15 Allstate explains how this works on its website: “A telematics device is 
generally a system that you install in your car that records information about your 
driving habits, such as the number of miles you drive, your speed, and how quickly 
you brake. These systems sometimes analyze the time of day when you drive, as 
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faster, or drive during particular times of day are more likely to get into 
accidents and/or have more severe accidents.  Using the data gathered from 
the devices, carriers can price auto insurance to better reflect the risks 
posed by the drivers.  In the future, carriers could gather this same 
information from other sources, including communications devices, E-
ZPass records, or sensors in the road.  It is not a stretch to imagine 
harnessing more and different information to price different types of 
policies.  For example, carriers could determine whether people who use 
cell phones at certain times of day, post revealing pictures on social media, 
or have certain search habits on the Internet are more likely to have liability 
claims, live shorter lives, or suffer more unemployment claims.  
But the potential benefits of big data (to the extent carriers can 
recognize them) will not be free.  Like any improvement in risk 
classification, additional expenditures on big data analytics could be 
socially wasteful and privately inefficient.  Further, like all risk 
classification refinements, to the extent that the promised gains in 
predictive accuracy materialize, classifying risks with big data analytics 
may undermine important risk spreading goals of insurance.  Lastly, 
mining individual data to build the data sets or to identify whether a 
potential insured falls into a particular risk category could invade 
policyholder privacy.  
Algorithmic parsing of new and complex data sets may also raise 
problems unseen in the past.  First, machine driven risk classification could 
yield unexpected correlations with risk.  For example, it may be that people 
from a particular racial or ethnic group have certain Internet search 
patterns: for example, Jews may search for the time of sundown more often 
than other groups.  Insurers may find those search results yield correlations 
to particular risks (like Tay Sachs).  Carriers focusing on strange 
algorithmic correlations, like Internet searches to risk of disease, may 
inadvertently burden these groups with higher prices.16 Second, insurers 
classifying risk with big data will harvest and use personal information 
                                                                                                                                
well. If you use a telematics device from your insurer, you agree to allow the 
device to send this information to your insurance company.” Tools & Resources: 
What Is a Telematics Device?, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstate.com/tools-and-
resources/car-insurance/telematics-device.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
16 Of course, it is likely that insurers can already identify individuals by race, 
gender, ethnic group, etc. without asking these questions. What is different about 
big data is that the algorithms identifying the correlations may mask the fact that 
particular groups are being charged higher prices. 
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indirectly, without asking the policyholders for permission.  This may 
cause certain privacy invasions unanticipated by current regulatory 
regimes.  Further, the predictive power of big data may allow insurers to 
determine personally identifiable information about policyholders without 
asking them directly.  This means that insurers could be invading new 
zones of privacy or finding ways to invade zones of privacy once thought 
protected.  
Thus, while it may be a natural evolution for carriers to use big 
data to classify risk, there may be significant financial and social costs to 
doing so.  These costs may require a revolutionary approach to regulating 
risk classification.  Regulators can no longer rely, to the extent they ever 
could, on discriminatory intent to protect certain groups from higher prices.  
To the contrary, regulators must recognize that big data may make it even 
more likely that certain groups will be burdened with higher prices without 
any evidence of intentional discrimination.  Whether this matters depends 
on whether a jurisdiction views a particular line of insurance as a means to 
spread risk generally across society or whether the jurisdiction is 
comfortable charging risky groups more for coverage regardless of the 
social context in which those risks materialize.  Thus, as will be discussed, 
big data requires a move from regulating based on discriminatory intent to 
disparate impact.  Further, regulators must determine what information, if 
any, policyholders may keep private.  To protect those privacy matters, 
regulators will have to increase their computing capacity to analyze the 
data inputs, algorithms, and outputs of insurers’ classification schemes.   
This Article looks at the impact of the opaque proxies created by 
big data and offers some regulatory suggestions to control the risk that 
individuals or groups will be unfairly burdened by the classification 
scheme and minimize the risk that insurers will invade individual privacy 
in new or more nuanced ways. 
 
A.  THE RISK CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK 
 
Insurers classify risks by trying to predict the probability that a 
potential insured will suffer a loss and the magnitude of that loss should it 
come to pass.  To make that prediction, underwriters have traditionally 
looked at the features and the experience of a potential insured to determine 
whether and how those features and experiences correlate to insurable 
losses.17 Feature rating bases prices on the observable traits of an insured.  
                                                                                                                                
17 Abraham, supra note 11, at 413–14. 
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These traits could be inherent, like age, race, gender, or national origin. 
Feature rating could also look to certain systems that insureds have in place 
to prevent loss, like smoke detectors, risk management protocols, or 
whether the insured has taken a particular kind of risk management class 
(e.g., drivers education). 18  Some of these characteristics are malleable; 
others are not.  That is, an insurer can only control some of these features.  
In contrast to feature rating, experience rating prices risk based on the loss 
history of the individual policyholder.19 
Some individuals have a vector of characteristics that has a low 
probability of loss conditional on the observables.  These individuals 
represent a low risk and are charged relatively low prices for their 
insurance.  Others have characteristics that correlate more strongly with 
loss. These individuals represent a higher risk and are charged higher 
prices.  
Insurers have a significant financial incentive to classify insureds 
properly on the basis of risk.  Accurate risk classification can impact the 
company’s bottom line in two ways.  An insurer who offers lower prices 
for good risks could add low risk insureds into its risk pool and thus lower 
its own risk of paying out.  And, if multiple insurers are in the market, 
accurate risk pricing could allow an insurer to skim good risks away from 
competitors, leaving the competitor with a comparatively worse risk pool, 
thus raising its competitor’s risk of paying out.20  
There are well-rehearsed benefits to and concerns with risk 
classification.  On the positive side, accurate risk classification can help 
mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard.  On the negative side, risk 
classification can be socially costly, may create unfair burdens on certain 
groups, and may implicate socially suspect categorizations such as race, 
national origin, or gender.  
 
1.  Benefits of Risk Classification 
 
In addition to the profit motives listed above, carriers may give 
three justifications for classifying and charging higher premiums on the 
                                                                                                                                
18  See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination 
Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 202 (2014). 
19 See id.  
20 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 67 (1986); Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: 
Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003). 
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basis of perceived risk.  These reasons are tied directly to the classic twin 
insurance dilemmas: adverse selection and moral hazard.  
First, pricing based on risk allows insurers to combat adverse 
selection by marketing to low risks.21 Potential insureds who are less likely 
to suffer harm may not want to pay a price that reflects the likely harm of 
the entire population, including high, medium, and low risks.  Low risks 
(theoretically) may go without insurance rather than pay the premiums that 
reflect a mix of high and low risk insureds.22 Thus, risk classification can 
help alleviate some of the consequences of adverse selection by allowing 
insurers to price products to entice low risks to enter the insurance pool.23 
Second, and relatedly, pricing based on risk may be more fair to 
low risk insureds.  All insurance pools are somewhat heterogeneous with 
low risks subsidizing higher risk policyholders.  Risk classification can 
remove some of the heterogeneity by putting like risks together.  The more 
refined the classification scheme, the more homogenous the resulting pools 
will be, which will then require less subsidization from low risks to high 
risks. 
Third, risk classification is also a form of moral hazard 
mitigation.24 Pricing based on risk provides a signal to insureds about their 
riskiness.25 To the extent that insureds have control over the characteristic 
                                                                                                                                
21 ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 67. 
22 As Ken Abraham explained, “insurance is only one of a number of ways of 
satisfying the demand for protection against risk. With few exceptions, insurance 
need not be purchased; people can forgo it if insurance is too expensive.” 
Abraham, supra note 11, at 407. 
23 ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 67. The likelihood of this adverse selection is 
unclear. There is some evidence that low risk individuals are risk adverse and tend 
to buy insurance as well as take added precautions. See, e.g., David Hemenway, 
Propitious Selection, 105 Q.J. ECON. 1063 (1990); see also Peter Siegelman, 
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 
1223 (2004) (reviewing the literature on propitious selection). The impact of this 
propitious selection in various insurance markets is unclear and, even if there is 
some form of propitious selection, pricing based on risk remains a potential 
marketing opportunity to low risk groups that typically go without insurance.  
24 Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto 
to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1419 (2013). 
25 See Abraham, supra note 11, at 413 (“Risk classifications should reflect 
differences in expected losses between classes of insureds; ideally, they should 
also create loss prevention incentives based on variables within each insured’s 
control.”). 
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upon which they are being classified, the signal of a higher price may 
encourage potential insureds to change their behavior—either to take more 
precaution or to reduce the frequency of the risk creating activity.  To 
provide policyholders such incentives to change extant behaviors, insurers 
must reevaluate and reclassify policyholders periodically.26  
 
2.  Dangers of Risk Classification 
 
Even assuming that the classification accurately predicts risk, 
properly mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard, and allows insurers 
to increase their profits, allowing insurers to make these kind of 
distinctions among potential insureds raises three distinct types of 
concerns: efficiency, fairness, and privacy. 27  
 
a. Efficiency 
 
Risk classification may be inefficient in several ways.  First, it may 
be socially wasteful.  Risk classification is socially beneficial to the extent 
that insurers succeed in bringing new, low risk entities or individuals into 
the overall risk pool.  To the extent that insurers only succeed in moving 
low risks from one carrier to another, the money spent on risk classification 
is socially wasteful.28 This is especially problematic when it is particularly 
costly for the insurer to acquire the information it needs to segregate risk 
classes.  
Second, risk classification may be inefficient if the higher prices 
inhibit high-risk, but socially beneficial behaviors.29 For example, if high 
medical malpractice insurance premiums for obstetricians drive physicians 
out of that field and into others, risk classification may create 
inefficiencies.30  
                                                                                                                                
26 Id. 
27 Ronen Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 204-20; Abraham, supra note 11, at 
419–420. 
28 Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 208–09.  
29 Id. at 205. 
30 If it is inefficient to classify on the basis of risk in this type of situation, then 
there are still questions about who should subsidize the behavior. For example, 
should the entire insurance pool (in the example above, all physicians) pay a higher 
premium so as not to disincentivize the behavior? Or should the public at large 
subsidize the behavior through tax subsidies or caps on damages? 
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Third, risk classification may be inefficient because it may inhibit 
private acquisition of socially useful information.  If risk classification is 
based, in part, on the knowledge of the insured (e.g., in the case of genetic 
diseases known only through testing), insureds may choose not to obtain 
that information.31  
 
b.  Unfair burdens 
 
Beyond these concerns, risk classification may unfairly burden 
particular groups.  Some view insurance as a means of spreading risks 
throughout an entire population.32 Risk classification undermines these risk 
spreading ideals.  If all of society is (or all policyholders are) included in 
the pool, each individual can use insurance to maintain the status quo.  But 
if insurers classify on the basis of risk, or deny insurance based on the 
amount of risk a potential insured presents, some individuals may be 
significantly burdened or even locked out of the safety net provided by 
insurance.33  Said differently, if insurance is a means to promote social 
solidarity, the economic costs of risk factors should be distributed evenly 
across society.  Classifying on individual characteristics “undermine[s] this 
feature of insurance by ‘fragmenting communities into ever-smaller, more 
homogenous groups.’”34 
This ideal is particularly undermined if insurers classify risk based 
on a suspect category.35 Obviously, some groups are more likely to incur 
certain types of expenses than others.  Women are more likely to incur 
medical costs associated with pregnancy and breast cancer.  Men may have 
                                                                                                                                
31 Cf. Alexander Tabarrok, Genetic Testing: An Economic and Contractarian 
Analysis, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 75, 80 (1994) (explaining why people may choose 
not to get genetic testing even if there is a possibility that the information gained 
could help minimize the risk of future harm). 
32 See Baker, supra note 20, at 392–96 (arguing that those who believe risk 
classification is a fair mutual aid fail to see that the fairness justification for 
classification lacks the moral force its proponents believe it has). 
33 See id. at 392 (explaining how in the late 1980s insurance companies tried 
to exclude battered women from the insurance pool). 
34 Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 215. 
35  Indeed, the most obvious classifications will be based on just such 
distinctions. Age, sex, race, etc. have been traditional underwriting criteria. See, 
e.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 
517, 517 (1983). 
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lower life expectancies than women.36 African Americans are more likely 
to have medical costs associated with sickle cell anemia; Jews are more 
likely to have medical costs associated with Tay-Sachs.  The elderly are 
more likely to die than the young.  The young are more likely to get in car 
accidents than the middle aged.  The list could go on and on.  And, in some 
sense it may make sense to charge members of these groups more for 
different types of insurance because of their higher risk status.  But there 
may be significant social and other reasons to ignore the additional risk 
factors. 
First, to the extent that these groups are constitutionally protected 
based on race, religion, or national origin, there might be concerns that the 
classification system “reinforces or perpetuates broader social inequalities 
or . . . causes some sort of expressive harm by acknowledging and 
legitimating that prior unfair treatment.”37 Said differently, even if it is true 
that a particular group is more likely to suffer a particular kind of loss, one 
might be concerned that by being charged more, the extra charge reinforces 
negative stereotypes, the group suffers certain dignitary harms, and/or the 
group is unfairly burdened. 
Even if the classification is not based on a constitutionally 
protected class, risk classification may still be viewed as unfair if the rate is 
based upon a characteristic that is undeserved or when the potential insured 
does not have control over the characteristic.38 For example, even if it is 
true that women who have suffered domestic abuse tend to require 
additional health care services over the course of their lives, it may be 
unfair to charge these women higher premiums, because the victims do not 
deserve their high-risk status. 39  It is, of course, difficult to determine 
                                                                                                                                
36  World Health Statistics 2014, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 15, 2014), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/world-health-statistics-
2014/en/. 
37 Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 217. 
38 See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually 
Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
355, 384–85 (1997); Austin, supra note 35, at 559–60. 
39 See Hellman, supra note 38, at 356–57, 369, 384. This intuition is doubly 
true when the characteristic is both undeserved and uncontrollable. As Alexander 
Tabarrok notes in the context of pricing based on health risks: 
First, the intuition that those with higher risks should bear 
the costs seems less justifiable when the higher risk is not a 
matter of choice. Is it right that someone with the Huntington’s 
gene should have to pay potentially staggering insurance bills or 
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whether an insured deserves or can control a characteristic,40 but these are 
debates into which I need not wade for purposes of this Article.  It is 
merely important to note that even if certain characteristics predict risk 
accurately there may be reasons that insurers should not classify their 
insured on that basis.  Likewise it may be unfair to burden individuals with 
higher rates for socially valuable activity.  For example, women in their 
twenties and thirties are more likely to incur medical expenses related to 
child birth.  But it may not be fair to charge them higher premiums based 
on those expected medical expenses. 
Further, and relatedly, some may view as unfair risk classifications 
based on characteristics that do not seem to cause the particular harm 
predicted.  Of course, all risk classifications are based on correlation, not 
causation.  But some correlations have a strong causal backbone.  For 
example, the link between Huntington’s disease and death is more than just 
correlative, and, for example, insurers can tell strong causal stories about 
the links between obesity and health.  Other correlations may seem random, 
or even discriminatory, but actually have certain causal links.  For example, 
facially there does not appear to be a link between credit scores and 
automobile accidents.  There may, however, be common psychological and 
biological roots to financial risk-taking and risky driving.41  But, where the 
                                                                                                                                
even [be] denied health insurance altogether? Second, charging 
higher premiums will not reduce the number of people with 
Huntington’s. Thus, in this case, there is no efficiency gain from 
charging high risk elements larger premiums (only a wealth 
transfer). 
Tabarrok, supra note 31, at 80. 
40 Take health status, for example: in some respects, insureds can control their 
risk factors: they can stay fit, eat right, and abstain from smoking or drinking too 
much.  But, of course, fit people can get sick, many obese people live until old age, 
and smokers may not get cancer.  So what does it mean to control one’s health 
status? See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 215. 
41  See Patrick L. Brockett & Linda L. Golden, Biological and 
Psychobehavioral Correlates of Credit Scores and Automobile Insurance Losses: 
Toward an Explication of Why Credit Scoring Works, 74 J. OF RISK & INS. 23, 26 
(2007). Further, to the extent that bad credit scores significantly correlate with 
suspect or vulnerable characteristics, there may be statistical methods to isolate and 
eliminate these proxy effects while maintaining the predictive accuracy of the 
variables. See generally Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, Implementing Anti-
Discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. 
POL’Y 206 (2011). 
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characteristic is causally remote from the predicted loss and is thus 
perceived to be non-causal (perhaps in a but-for sense of the word), the use 
of the characteristic may be challenged on the ground that the classification 
is unfair.42 For example, there is near perfect correlation between the per 
capita consumption of cheese and the number of people who die by 
becoming entangled in their own bed sheets.43 But there is little argument 
that the amount of cheese consumed in the United States says anything 
interesting about death by entanglement.  If there is no causal connection, it 
is unclear that it is reasonable for insurers to base rates on spurious 
correlations. 
Lastly, there are fairness concerns based on the fact that risk 
classification is expensive and imperfect. 44  Despite the benefits of risk 
classification, carriers do not have an incentive to make risk classes 
completely homogenous (nor could they necessarily do so).  Risk 
classification is expensive, and at some point the marginal increase in 
homogeneity may cost more than the marginal benefit to the insurer.45 
Thus, some members of the group will always be a higher risk than other 
members of the same risk class.  To the extent that the burden of the 
imperfections and inaccuracies in the classification scheme falls 
disproportionately on one group over another, risk classification may 
implicate additional fairness concerns.46 
 
c.  Privacy 
 
Risk classification raises a number of privacy concerns.  To 
classify risks, insurers may have to ask about or otherwise discern 
particularly intimate information about an insured, such as credit score, 
HIV status, genetic information, or sexual orientation.47 Insurers could also 
                                                                                                                                
42 See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 218–20. 
43 See Tyler Vigen, Per Capita Consumption of Cheese (US) Correlates with 
Number of People Who Died by Becoming Tangled in Their Bedsheets, SPURIOUS 
CORRELATIONS, http://www.tylervigen.com/view_correlation?id=7 (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2014). 
44  Ken Abraham refers to this problem as differential inaccuracy. See 
ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 84–89; Abraham, supra note 11, at 429–36. 
45 Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 217 (“Efficient insurance regimes will 
only invest in improving classification to the extent that the resulting benefits are 
larger than [the cost of doing so].”). 
46 Abraham, supra note 11, at 429–36. 
47 Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 220. 
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ask questions about drug and alcohol use, lifestyle, exercise, etc.  Of 
course, these are not just idle questions.  Failure to answer or answer 
truthfully could have significant ramifications.  Potential insureds refusing 
to answer could be denied coverage.48  And policyholders who respond 
inaccurately could be denied coverage after suffering a loss. 49  These 
privacy concerns are redoubled when one considers that insurance is a de 
facto requirement for a number of important life activities like driving a car 
and owning a home.50 Thus, many may be forced to divulge particularly 
intimate information about themselves to obtain insurance. 
Which areas are off limits and which questions delve too deeply 
into private spheres depends on the product line and one’s prior 
assumptions about the strength and meaning of privacy.  For example, 
one’s use of alcohol, tobacco, or illegal drugs might be relevant to life 
expectancy and thus some may not view questions about these topics on a 
life insurance applications as invasions of privacy.  Others, however, may 
view those questions as intrusive of a personal sphere of privacy regardless 
of the relevance of the information to the line of insurance, because they 
represent inquiry into a particular type of personal activity.  As with the 
issues related to control over a particular risk factor,51 it is not necessary to 
settle debates about which questions are appropriate in which policy lines 
and which questions invade a particularly private sphere.  It is enough to 
note that risk classification may implicate privacy concerns even in the 
absence of the big data concerns to be raised later in this essay.  
 
                                                                                                                                
48 See Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal Issues Raised by Advances in 
Genetic Screening and Testing, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (1993) 
(refusing to answer questions about genetic background can lead to denial of 
coverage); James Monroe Smith, When Knowing the Law is Not Enough: 
Confronting Denial and Considering Sociocultural Issues Affecting HIV Positive 
People, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 34-35 (1995) (failing to disclose HIV 
diagnosis is a material misrepresentation justifying denial of coverage). 
49 Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 210. 
50 Id. at 220. 
51 See id. at 215. 
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II.  THINKING ABOUT BIG DATA 
 
A.  BIG DATA AND THE DATA DRIVING IT 
 
Big data derives its name from the mountain of information created 
by daily activities and gathered by all types of commercial and 
governmental entities.  The data includes such sources such as Internet 
“transactions, email, video, images, clickstream, logs, search queries, 
health records, and social networking interactions.”52 These online sources 
could include both the primary record (e.g., a tweet or Facebook post) and 
the metadata of the record (e.g., the time and date of posting, the type of 
media used in the post, the number of retweets, etc.).  But big data is not 
limited just to information from the Internet.  Big data can also include 
traditional data sets and it increasingly includes “sensors deployed in 
infrastructure such as communications networks, electric grids, global 
positioning satellites, roads and bridges, as well as in homes, clothing, and 
mobile phones.”53 
Given the vast reach and the variety of types of data, there is a 
tendency, especially among commercial entities, to define big data in terms 
of the amount of this information and the ability to manage that data.  For 
instance, McKinsey Global Institute, an offshoot of McKinsey & 
Company, defines big data as “datasets whose size is beyond the ability of 
typical database software tools to capture, store, manage, and analyze.”54 
These quantity definitions often refer to the rapidly increasing amount of 
data created every year.55 Other definitions point out that it is not just the 
amount, but also the type of data being gathered that matters.  For example, 
Forbes, writing for a corporate clientele, defined big data as “a collection of 
data from traditional and digital sources inside and outside your company 
                                                                                                                                
52 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 240. 
53 Id. 
54 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, 
COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 1, (McKinsey Global Inst. ed., 2011), available 
at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data _the_ 
next_frontier_for_innovation (click download full report). 
55  Kenneth Cukier, Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 (“[T]he world contains an 
unimaginably vast amount of digital information which is getting ever vaster ever 
more rapidly.”). 
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that represents a source for ongoing discovery and analysis.” 56  This 
collection of data, according to Forbes, includes structured and 
unstructured data.  The former refers to data points that are easily placed 
into databases.  The latter refers to inherently more messy data like text in 
tweets, video uploads, pictures, etc.57 
Simple size-and-kind definitions, however, tend to be driven by 
companies selling analytic products, marketers selling big data services, 
insurers trying to optimize offerings, and Wall Street traders interpreting 
and predicting the market.58 These definitions overstate the importance of 
the amount of data and understate the way the data is analyzed and the 
sociological meaning of the term.  “Big Data is less about data that is big 
than it is about a capacity to search, aggregate, and cross-reference large 
data sets.”59 Big data analytics do not necessarily rely on large data sets—
in fact, the set of data may be smaller than traditional (non big) data sets.60 
Rather than think of big data as different because it relies on big data sets, 
it is better to think of big data analytics as different because big data uses 
complex algorithms to mine messy and diverse data sets.61 What is unique 
about big data is that the algorithms driving the analytics are not like 
                                                                                                                                
56  Lisa Arthur, What is Big Data?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaarthur/2013/08/15/what-is-big-data/. 
57 Id. 
58Nicole Wong, Twitter’s former legal director and the Obama administration’s 
Deputy U.S. Chief Technology Officer, tweeted, “Tweeps, can you point me to the best 
available definition of ‘big data’? A lot of marketing-speak out there, low on 
precision.” Nicole Wong, Twitter (Jan. 25 2014, 12:56 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
nicolewong/status/426413033200812033. See also Tim Harford, Big Data: Are We 
Making a Big Mistake?, FIN. TIMES (March 28, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ 
21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0.html# axzz30tH6hAOd (“As with so many 
buzzwords, ‘big data’ is a vague term, often thrown around by people with something 
to sell.”); Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: 
Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. 
COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663 (2012). 
59 See Boyd & Crawford, supra note 58, at 663.  
60 Size-based definitions are limiting in two respects. First, they are limited 
temporally given the ever-expanding computational power of computers. What 
once required so-called super computers can now be done on simple desktop 
machines. Second, the definition is over-inclusive. Some of the data “encompassed 
by Big Data (e.g. all Twitter messages about a particular topic) is not nearly as 
large as earlier data sets that were not considered Big data (e.g. census data).” Id. 
61 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 2, at 96. 
2014  RISK CLASSIFICATION’S (R)EVOLUTION 355 
 
traditional statistical techniques, and allow data scientists to look at data 
that was once thought unusable.  These new techniques have also given rise 
to the sociological meaning of big data.  As Crawford and Schultz argue, 
there is a growing and pervasive “belief that large data sets generate results 
with greater truth, objectivity, and accuracy.”62 
Despite this belief in the perfection of big data, there may be 
serious concerns about the data and the outputs.  First, there are a number 
of errors that may exist in the data.  As Boyd and Crawford explain, 
“[l]arge data sets from Internet sources are often unreliable, prone to 
outages and losses, and these errors and gaps are magnified when multiple 
data sets are used together.”63 Moreover, some have expressed concerns 
about which data are collected and used.  For example, “in case of social 
media data, there is a ‘data cleaning’ process: making decisions about what 
attributes and variables will be counted, and which will be ignored.  This 
process is inherently subjective.”64 Even choosing to use certain data can be 
misleading.  Not everyone is on Twitter or Facebook, and those who are 
aren’t created equally.  Some users post far more often than others.65 And 
the data sets themselves are far from pure.  Twitter, for example, doesn’t 
make available all tweets and any sampling will likely over-represent the 
present.66 Moreover, even if the data were clean and unbiased, there is a 
problem of over fitting.  Given the enormous number of data points 
considered, there is a risk that the algorithms will find correlations with 
statistical significance even if there is no meaningful connection between 
the variables.67  
That said, private actors have every incentive to find meaningful 
correlations and data analysts are well aware of the problems listed above.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that these concerns have not dampened either the 
demand for big data analytics or the belief in the power of the correlative 
and predictive outputs.68 This demand has created a business of collecting 
                                                                                                                                
62 Id. 
63 Boyd & Crawford, supra note 58, at 668. 
64 Id. at 667. 
65 Id. at 669. 
66 Id. 
67 Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems With Big Data, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nyti.ms/1kgErs2; Harford, supra note 58 
(detailing the downfall of Google Flu Trends as a “theory-free, data-rich model”). 
68 In part this may be because data scientists managing big data analytics 
promise that they can massage the messy data and weed out correlations that have 
no real causal validity. 
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personal information either for use of the entity doing the collecting or for 
sale to third parties.  The next section provides a brief taxonomy about how 
big data relates to personal information and the resulting privacy concerns. 
 
B.  USES OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
There are serious concerns about the way entities collect and use 
personal information.69 These privacy concerns have driven much of the 
debate about the use of big data.  There are a number of different ways that 
data brokers and other entities could interact with an individual’s personal 
information.  Many of those ways could implicate a number of privacy 
concerns.  Rather than catalog various privacy concerns and the debate 
surrounding them70—the contours of which are not directly relevant to this 
paper—what follows is a brief description of the ways in which big data 
could use personal information generally and a sense of the privacy 
implications.  
First, personal information could be harvested to power the 
algorithms.  As described above, companies obtain data from a diverse set 
of human activities, including online interactions such as ecommerce or 
social networking and other activities of daily living like using a cell phone 
or driving a car with E-ZPass.71 Data brokers collect and categorize each of 
these data sources to identify correlations and predictions about individuals 
and their habits.  Data brokers cull and sift reams of this personal data 
without the knowledge of those who generate the data.  Generally speaking 
this data need not be identified with a particular person.  Or, at least, in this 
context, the data are not used in a personally identifiable way.  Rather, the 
data are grist for the algorithm mill.  It is the raw material out of which the 
big data analytics create their correlations and predictions.  From a privacy 
standpoint, one might be concerned that the data are being harvested 
without consent and often without the knowledge of the content 
                                                                                                                                
69 Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 393, 408 (2014). 
70 For an example of the types of concerns, see id. For a flavor of the debate, 
see Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 25 (2013). 
71 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 240. 
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generators.72  Further, while the data is not necessarily used to identify 
specific individuals, personal identity is also not scrubbed from the data.73 
Second, companies run personally identifiable information through 
the algorithm.  That is, companies use personal information from a 
particular individual to determine whether that individual’s characteristics 
correlate to a particular set of outcomes.  As above, there are significant 
concerns in this respect that individuals do not know what data is being 
harvested and used to determine correlations.  For example, are banks using 
an individual’s Facebook posts or pictures to modify his or her credit 
ratings?  Or, in the context of this Article, are carriers gathering data about 
individual insureds to determine their riskiness?  The data collected and 
used in this way are not anonymous, nor can they be.  This raises, at a 
minimum, concerns about the access that corporations have to private data.  
There may be second order concerns related to this algorithmic use 
of personal data.  As Crawford and Schultz suggest, “[b]ig data processes 
can generate a model of what has a probability of being [personally 
identifiable information], essentially imagining your data for you.”74 For 
example, in 2012, Target used big data analytics to effectively predict 
which of its customers were pregnant and passed that information to its 
marketing arm. 75  That is, without asking any customers about their 
pregnancy status or harvesting that data in particular, Target was able to 
predict extremely sensitive and personal information about its customers.76 
Third, and relatedly, companies harvest and use data without 
respect to who generates the data for marketing purposes.  For example, 
companies typically gather all sorts of information from Internet searches 
to target marketing.  While few express concerns about this targeted 
marketing, it is nonetheless another way that companies use private 
information (individual searches) without permission.  
 
                                                                                                                                
72 Crawford & Schultz, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
73 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 251-252. 
74 Crawford & Schultz, supra note 2, at 98. 
75 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html. 
76 This so-called predictive privacy invasion may result in a number of harms. 
For example, marketers could attempt to avoid anti-discrimination statutes by 
simply directing on-line marketing to groups segregated by certain demographics, 
including race, gender, age, credit worthiness, etc. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 
2, at 99-100. Crawford and Schultz also raise concerns about predictive policing 
and health care privacy. 
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III.  BIG DATA AND RISK CLASSIFICATION 
 
When risk classification actually results in identifying better and 
worse risks and provides carriers the ability to price these differential risks 
correctly, the benefits of risk classification mostly redound to the insurer in 
the form of greater profits from a better risk pool and to low risks in the 
form of lower-cost insurance.  The costs, on the other hand, manifest in the 
form of privacy invasions and higher prices on select groups.  As such, it is 
easy to see why insurers would want to enhance their classification 
capabilities.  Big data offers just such an opportunity.   
There could, however, be a number of significant issues related to 
using big data to classify risk.  This Article assumes away myriad potential 
problems with the data77 by assuming that insurers only use good data—
that is, data that represents a good statistical sample, has few biases in 
place, and no major errors.  Further, this Article assumes that the data are 
providing correlations that represent actual differences between risk 
classes.  That is, this Article assumes the data show that some set of people 
who have some set of characteristics is more risky than some other set.  
Even if all of this is true, there remain specific efficiency, fairness, and 
privacy concerns raised by insurer’s use of big data to classify risks. 
The social and private costs attached to using big data to classify 
risks may be significant and include inefficient investment of capital, unfair 
burdening of groups and individuals, and inappropriate invasions of 
personal privacy.  These costs suggest potential regulatory responses.  
Whether and how regulators should respond, however, turns on a number 
of things including the incentives that private actors have in the 
marketplace to self-correct, the cost of any regulatory response, the costs 
created in the absence of a regulatory response, and views about the 
underlying purpose of insurance.  Typically it is left to industry to fix 
problems stemming from inefficient investments.  Carriers have significant 
incentives to determine for themselves whether investments in big data are 
profitable and adding new insureds to the pool.  And it is not clear there is a 
role for regulators in solving whatever collective action problems might 
exist.  On the other hand, regulators may have a reason to insert themselves 
into problems created by the disincentives created by big data, unfair 
burdens created by risk classification, and increased privacy concerns. 
This part focuses on the costs created. Part IV addresses potential 
regulatory responses.  
                                                                                                                                
77 See Boyd & Crawford, supra note 58, at 666-75. 
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A.  EFFICIENCY 
 
Most carrier expenditures implicate a number of efficiency 
concerns.  Carriers’ expenditures on marketing, information technology, or 
even policy drafting could be unprofitable, socially wasteful or otherwise 
inefficient.  Investments in big data to classify risk are no different.  For 
example, it might be extraordinarily expensive to harness big data and 
generate more refined risk classifications.  Each carrier might have to 
spend significant sums to make marginal improvements to their risk 
classification scheme.  These costs could be exacerbated because carriers 
may feel a pressure to follow popular trends.  Given the press coverage on 
the wonders of big data, firm leaders may spend exorbitantly even if the 
new classification scheme costs more than it generates in revenue for two 
reasons.  First, carriers may hope that classifying based on big data now 
will reap profits in the future.  Second, carriers may fear that if other 
insurers get better at classifying risks, they will lose low risk insureds, thus 
making their pool worse and forcing them to pay out more.  These 
investments may be inefficient in two ways.  First, it is unclear whether the 
refinements based on big data (to the extent they can be made) will bring in 
new, low risk policyholders into the insurance pool.  If not, the 
expenditures on risk classification through big data will be socially 
wasteful, perhaps significantly so if the associated costs are particularly 
high.  Second, the investment in big data may not be profitable.  Given the 
collective action problem, firms may continue to invest so that a competitor 
that is using big data does not undercut their prices. 
Whether, in fact, the expenditures to classify risk using big data are 
worth it for either the individual firm or for the industry as a whole is an 
empirical question.  In thinking through this analysis, one must determine 
the following: is the use of big data profitable?  Are new insureds being 
added?  Is there a collective action problem spurring socially wasteful 
investments?  
Further, the fear of big data may have inefficient impacts on 
policyholders and potential insureds.  Individuals may refuse to invest in 
socially useful activities or fail to acquire important information for fear of 
being charged higher premiums or excluded from insurance altogether.  For 
example, genetic testing could be both a socially useful activity and 
provide privately important information.  It could both inform public 
understanding of genetic disorders and private decisions about health and 
welfare.  But individuals may forgo genetic testing because insurers can 
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use the information discovered by those tests to set rates for or exclude 
individuals from life, disability, and long-term care insurance.78  
 
B.  FAIRNESS 
 
Policyholders may argue that using big data to classify risk unfairly 
burdens some groups.  Of course, all risk classification burdens some 
groups more than others—that is the nature of differential pricing.  Big 
data, however, has the potential to change old debates about risk spreading 
versus pricing based on risk.  As discussed below, the algorithms driving 
big data analytics may find correlations between risk and suspect or 
vulnerable classes or based on non-causal factors without the insurer being 
aware that particular groups are being financially burdened.  
Whether these higher prices should be thought of as unfair 
depends, in no small part, on one’s belief about the underlying nature of 
insurance.79  
 
1.  Proxies for Suspect and Vulnerable Classes 
 
Insurers have long gathered data about policyholders’ race, gender, 
age, and income level for many different lines of insurance.  Insurers could 
easily use traditional statistical techniques to determine whether these or 
other suspect or vulnerable characteristics correlate strongly with loss.  
Even if characteristics that receive heightened constitutional protection 
(such as race, religion, and national origin),80 characteristics that identify 
individuals as members of vulnerable groups (such as income), or 
characteristics that are otherwise undeserved (such as victims of domestic 
violence)81 correlate more significantly with loss, there may be good policy 
reasons not to charge higher premiums on this basis alone.  The cause of 
the higher risk rating may be bound tightly to sociological and historical 
                                                                                                                                
78 See Kira Peikoff, Fearing Punishment for Bad Genes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2014), http://nyti.ms/1mVTzYS. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 121 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.), only covers the behavior of health insurers.  
It does not prohibit using information from genetic testing to price or exclude 
individuals from other insurance products. 
79 See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text. 
80 Austin, supra note 35, at 517. 
81 See Baker, supra note 20, at 392. 
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conditions, making the higher risk status undeserved.  Charging higher 
premiums “saddles people with all the consequences of their high risk 
status, whether deserved or not . . . [and] entitles other people to all the 
benefits of their low risk status, also whether deserved or not.”82  
These consequences could include making it more difficult to 
access insurance as a social safety net, reinforcing negative stereotypes, 
and causing dignitary harms.  The first of these is obvious.  Making 
insurance more expensive may make it impossible for some individuals to 
purchase the financial security that insurance provides.  But charging more 
could have other negative effects.  If it is known that members of a group 
pay higher premiums because they are members of the group (even if there 
are actuarial reasons for the higher premiums), it may reinforce a belief that 
the members of the group deserve their high-risk status or are burdens on 
society.  For example, people may believe that Jews deserve Tay Sachs, 
that the poor actively choose not to take care of their health or property, or 
that victims of domestic abuse are responsible for their additional medical 
costs.  This could serve to further reinforce negative stereotypes and 
thereby cause dignitary harms. 
But insurers need not base the higher premiums directly on the 
characteristics listed above.  There could be non-suspect individual 
characteristics that correlate with both a suspect or vulnerable characteristic 
and high-risk status.  For example, property insurers could base higher 
property insurance rates on crime statistics.  If people of color primarily 
live in areas with higher crime rates, the higher premiums would be based 
on a factor—crime rates—that correlates with race.  Carriers could justify 
additional premiums based on the higher rate of loss in high crime areas.  
Outside of any current regulatory regime that prohibits disparate impact,83 
would it be normatively defensible to allow insurers to charge higher rates 
                                                                                                                                
82 Id. at 394. 
83  The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) recently promulgated a rule establishing that a plaintiff can establish a 
Fair Housing Act claim on the basis of discriminatory effects. HUD’s final rule 
declares that “[l]iability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a 
practice’s discriminatory effect . . . even if the practice was not motivated by a 
discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). This regulation presumably 
prohibits charging higher rates for property insurance to people of color even if the 
rates are actuarially fair. That is, the rule would prohibit the disparate impact of the 
higher prices for property insurance. This rule is, of course, limited to those 
insurance types that lay within HUD’s ambit. Neither this rule nor any other 
prohibits higher prices for life or auto insurance. 
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to people of color?  There are strong arguments on both sides of this 
debate.  On one hand, as with all risk classification, price differentiation 
allows a carrier to control adverse selection and moral hazard.  Further, 
some may view it as fairer to charge those who have less of a risk of loss 
less for their property insurance. 84  On the other hand, if one views 
insurance as a means of risk spreading, it may be unattractive to charge the 
high risk group higher premiums.  This argument has additional weight in 
this example because there may be historical and sociological reasons for 
higher crime in particular areas.  Further, insureds who live in high crime 
areas may not have the means to move.  Under this view, society as a 
whole bears some responsibility for the high-risk status of the insureds.  
And, importantly, because insureds cannot move, they likely cannot 
mitigate the risk of living in a high crime neighborhood.  Further, to the 
extent that areas of high crime are predominately made up of people of 
color, there may be a risk that the higher premiums reinforce negative 
stereotypes, and thereby impose dignitary harms on those affected.  
Big data has the potential to change some of this analysis, although 
it depends, in part, on the type of proxies that carriers find for high-risk 
status.  Insurers could find obvious correlations between non-suspect 
characteristics and both a suspect or vulnerable characteristic and high-risk 
status.  It is easy to imagine the kind of data that may correlate more 
strongly with women than men; particular racial, religious, or ethnic 
groups; people from a particular country; or particularly vulnerable 
individuals.  Women may “like” Oprah more often on Facebook, Jews may 
search more frequently for the precise timing of sundown on Google, 
people of Filipino decent may be more likely to follow @MannyPacquiao 
on Twitter, victims of domestic violence could search more frequently for 
women’s shelters or about restraining orders, and the poor may be more 
likely to look up information about social services. 
It is unlikely that carriers would make it known why policyholders 
fall into high-risk groups—for example, by explaining which behaviors 
correlate with higher risk.  But if they were to do so, these obvious proxies 
raise a similar set of normative arguments as described above.  Carriers 
could justify the higher rates on both the adverse selection argument and 
the argument that it may be fairer to the low risk group to pay less for 
coverage.  The moral hazard mitigation argument, however, holds little 
water in this context.  There is little argument that the correlatives to risk 
identified above are, in fact, causal.  As such, there is little benefit to 
                                                                                                                                
84 Baker, supra note 20, at 375. 
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encouraging, for example, fewer “likes” on Facebook or fewer Google 
searches for sundown.  Further, to the extent that the proxies are obviously 
coextensive with a suspect or vulnerable group, there may be a risk that the 
higher premiums reinforce negative stereotypes and impose dignitary 
harms on those affected.  
The far more likely scenario is that it will not be readily apparent to 
anyone why some individuals are charged more.  The algorithms driving 
big data will simply spit out higher prices for some policyholders than 
others.  Carriers will not directly explain nor will it be obvious to insureds 
or third parties why some individuals are charged higher premiums.  
Insurers may treat the information as proprietary and thus have an incentive 
to conceal the reason for the pricing from the policyholders (especially 
given that there is likely no moral hazard mitigation to be done).  This may 
mean that the algorithms driving risk classification will identify groups of 
risky individuals without anyone intending or even knowing that many of 
the identified individuals are members of a suspect or vulnerable group.85 
As discussed below, this opacity changes the arguments for and against risk 
classification.  Importantly, if it is not clear who is charged more for 
insurance or why, there is little argument that insurers are reinforcing 
stereotypes or that policyholders are suffering dignitary harms. 
As with obvious proxies, carriers could argue that the risk 
classification helps mitigate adverse selection and is fairer to low risk 
groups.  And, like obvious proxies, carriers cannot argue that the pricing 
helps mitigate moral hazard.  There is no risk-related reason to encourage 
people not to buy certain types of paper towels or place cell phone calls at a 
particular time of day. 
What is different is that the reasons against classifying risk look 
very different.  Here, even if a proxy is coextensive with a suspect class, 
the reasons for the increased rates are obscured.  The algorithms are simply 
spitting out high-risk groups.  The carriers may not even know that many or 
most of those charged higher rates are members of suspect or vulnerable 
                                                                                                                                
85 There could be another possibility: the carriers reveal the correlations with 
risk, but those correlations are not obviously linked to a particular suspect or 
vulnerable class. Hypothetically, imagine that individuals who buy a particular 
kind or amount of paper towel, who call particular area codes at particular times of 
day, or who use social media in a particular way are more susceptible to a 
particular type of risk and are more likely to be members of a suspect or vulnerable 
group. There is nothing obvious to link those behaviors to particular groups. In that 
case, the same arguments about opacity discussed below apply. 
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groups.  And given this, it is unlikely that policyholders or the public know 
either.  Thus, it is difficult to see how the higher rates reinforce stereotypes 
or cause particular groups to suffer dignitary harms.  
The remaining argument against using characteristics that correlate 
with both a risk factor and a suspect class is that the group will be burdened 
unfairly.  Whether this disparate impact matters depends in large part on 
whether one views insurance as a vehicle for social solidarity through risk 
spreading or not.  As above, if a particular group has a propensity for 
higher risk, then one may consider it fair to charge that group more for 
coverage.  If one views insurance as a mechanism for society-wide risk 
spreading, then risk classification is rarely acceptable. 
The table below summarizes these arguments.  The three left 
columns represent the general arguments for risk classification.  Where an 
“X” appears, carriers can reasonably make an argument in favor of 
classifying risk based on the type of proxy.  As the chart makes clear, any 
time a characteristic correlates with risk—even if that characteristic also 
correlates with a suspect or vulnerable group—an insurer can argue that 
charging higher premiums helps fight adverse selection and is fairer to the 
low-risk group.86 But, for most of these potential correlations, insurers have 
no reason to encourage their insureds to minimize the activity correlated 
with risk and thus do not mitigate moral hazard through pricing.  Carriers 
can only mitigate moral hazard when the correlation to risk is known, is 
causal to the risk, and can be controlled by the policyholder.87 For example, 
insurers can offer price breaks to install smoke detectors or take defensive 
driving classes.  This helps mitigate the risk from materializing and 
controls moral hazard.  On the other hand, if the price of auto insurance is 
based on age or sex, charging higher prices to young men does not 
encourage a different type of behavior.  Policyholders are unlikely to be 
able to control most of the correlations found through big data.  Even if the 
policyholder can control the characteristic upon which the carrier classified 
                                                                                                                                
86 See Abraham, supra note 11. There are reasons to question the adverse 
selection story generally. It is, however, intuitively true that insurers can induce 
additional policyholders to pay for coverage by offering lower rates. In doing so, 
carriers may be mitigating some adverse selection, or at least enhancing their 
bottom line. This adverse selection argument is subject to a number of constraints. 
See e.g., Ronen Avraham et al., Towards a Universal Framework for Insurance 
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
87  See generally Baker & Swedloff, supra note 24 (discussing risk-based 
pricing as a means of mitigating moral hazard). 
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the risk (e.g., by defriending Oprah), it is unlikely that the changed 
behavior will actually result in fewer losses. 
The arguments against classifying risk based on suspect 
classifications are far more equivocal.  One could argue that charging more 
simply based on an underlying suspect or vulnerable characteristic 
reinforces structural inequality, reinforces stereotypes, and creates dignitary 
harms.  It may be that where a carrier uses a proxy (whether through big 
data or not) that is obvious and fairly coextensive with a suspect class, the 
higher premiums will create the same harms.  But, as the reasons for the 
higher premiums become less clear, as the algorithms obscure who is 
paying more and for what reason, the arguments change.  With no obvious 
connection to a particular group, the extra premiums neither cause dignitary 
harms nor reinforce negative stereotypes.  Thus, the only argument left 
against classifying risk in this way is that the high-risk group is unfairly 
burdened by the high premiums.  This puts one’s view of insurance front 
and center in the debate. 
 
Arguments For/Against Using Proxies For Suspect Classes in Risk 
Classification 
 Arguments for Risk Classification Arguments Against Classifying 
Based on Suspect Class 
 Adverse 
Selection 
Moral 
Hazard 
Fairness 
to Low 
Risk 
Reinforce 
Stereo-
type 
Dignitary 
Harms 
Unfair 
burden 
Suspect 
characteristic 
directly 
correlates to risk 
X  X X X X 
Non-suspect 
characteristic 
correlates to 
suspect 
characteristic 
and risk 
X If insured 
can 
control 
the factor 
X X X X 
Obvious big data 
correlation with 
suspect 
characteristic 
and risk  
X  X X X X 
Nonobvious big 
data correlation 
with suspect 
characteristic 
and risk  
X  X   X 
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2.  Non-Causal Correlations 
 
Even if insurers identify correlations with risk that do not 
disparately impact suspect or vulnerable groups, there may other concerns 
with correlations identified by big data.  The algorithms may find 
correlations with risk for which carriers can tell no plausible story about the 
causal connection between the behavior and the loss.  Big data is very good 
at finding subtle correlations, but these correlations may not be meaningful 
because the correlations are to activities that are unrelated to the underlying 
loss.88 Of course, both traditional and big data risk classification are based 
on correlations.  As discussed above, some correlations, such as the 
connection between smoking and illness or early death, have a significant 
causal backbone.  For other correlations, such as a link between age and 
driving, carriers can tell a plausible story: young men act rashly and do not 
have fully developed control over their rapidly changing emotions, and are 
therefore more erratic drivers.  But, there are certainly identifiable 
correlations with risk for which there is no plausible story—for example 
the link between consumption of cheese and death by entanglement in bed 
sheets.89 If there is no causal connection, it is unclear that it is reasonable 
for insurers to base rates on spurious correlations. 
 Big data analytics exacerbate concerns that insurers will identify 
risks which have no causal relationship whatsoever to the insured loss.  In 
part, this is due to the magic of big data.  The Holy Grail for big data is 
finding subtle, yet undiscovered correlations.  The problem, of course, is 
that finding such non-causally related correlations means that the 
policyholder cannot, and likely should not, try to minimize the activity, 
behavior, or characteristic.  Imagine the following: using big data analytics, 
some carrier realizes that individuals who purchase vampire novels on 
                                                                                                                                
88 “[A]lthough big data is very good at detecting correlations, especially subtle 
correlations that an analysis of smaller data sets might miss, it never tells us which 
correlations are meaningful. A big data analysis might reveal, for instance, that 
from 2006 to 2011 the United States murder rate was well correlated with the 
market share of Internet Explorer: Both went down sharply. But, it’s hard to 
imagine there is any causal relationship between the two. Likewise, from 1998 to 
2007 the number of new cases of autism diagnosed was extremely well correlated 
with sales of organic food (both went up sharply), but identifying the correlation 
will not by itself tell us whether diet has anything to do with autism.” Marcus & 
Davis, supra note 67. 
89 See Vigen, supra note 43.  
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Amazon, "like" vampire related media on Facebook, or follow authors of 
vampire fiction on Twitter are more likely to engage in risky behavior.  
Reading vampire novels or being a fan of vampire fiction could be within 
the control of the policyholder, but should insurers be allowed to classify 
risks along these lines?  There is likely little, if any, causal connection 
between being a fan of vampire fiction and an actual risk.  Carriers have 
little reason to encourage the policyholder to be less of a fan of vampire 
fiction.  So what is left to justify the higher prices?  Carriers, of course, can 
still argue that prohibiting price discrimination—even for these non-causal 
characteristics—would create adverse selection problems and be unfair to 
low risk policy holders.90  
Again, this pits two different kinds of fairness arguments against 
each other.  Big data has laid bare the essential nature of insurance.  Should 
individuals who are higher risks have to bear the burden of that status even 
when no one can tell a reasonable story about why they have that high-risk 
status?  Should low risks subsidize high risks even if they do not have any 
reason for being in the low-risk group? 
 
3.  Opacity in Correlation 
 
As noted above, big data is unlikely to provide simple, easily 
explainable reasons for higher premiums.  Rather, carriers classifying risk 
in this way will likely just charge some group of policyholders higher 
premiums without explanation based a number of factors, each of which is 
obscured by the underlying algorithmic analysis.  This lack of transparency 
raises a number of issues. 
On the one hand, as noted above, opacity undermines fears that 
higher rates will create a particular stigma or dignitary harm to the high-
risk group.  Policyholders likely will not know whether they or others are 
paying more for insurance or whether any particular groups are being 
singled out for higher rates.  Thus, higher rates may not reinforce 
stereotypes, stigmatize a particular group, or create dignitary harms.  But, 
the lack of transparency means that a policyholder may not be able to 
change his or her behavior even if he or she has characteristics that should 
and may be classified as high risk and can and should be controlled.  In 
short, unless the carrier identifies which factors are leading to higher rates, 
there is little moral hazard mitigation to be done.  All that is left to justify 
                                                                                                                                
90 The likelihood of these claims depends in large part on the line of insurance. 
See Avraham et al., supra note 86. 
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the difference is a fear of adverse selection and a sense that it would be 
fairer to the low risks to charge them less.  
Further, the opacity of the algorithm raises concerns about error.  
Imagine that the overall classification system works in that the insurer 
correctly identifies a certain set of characteristics that correlate with more 
risk, the carrier induces more insureds into the risk pool, and the 
classification system is otherwise efficient.  There may still be individuals 
who are misclassified as high risk.  The lack of transparency in the data 
collected and the algorithm deriving correlations means that these 
otherwise low risk individuals may not be able to determine why they were 
moved into the higher risk group or how to fix it.  
 
C.  PRIVACY 
 
Interestingly, both big data and risk classification raise significant 
privacy concerns.  First, as noted above, privacy issues are raised any time 
a carrier classifies risks (with or without big data) on intimate, personal 
information, like HIV status, marital status, sexual orientation, or genetic 
information. 91  Likewise, privacy concerns are implicated any time a 
company obtains and uses personal information to augment its databases or 
any time a company feeds personal information through its big data 
algorithms for correlative or predictive purposes.  Thus, it is natural that 
there would be significant privacy concerns when risk classification is 
combined with big data analytics.92 There are two principal ways that big 
data raises new privacy concerns for risk classification. 
First, insurers now may be able to collect information about current 
or potential policyholders from public sources that the carriers are 
prohibited from asking a policyholder about directly.  For example, it is 
reasonably easy to imagine that carriers could access information that 
policyholders share via social media about themselves, including for 
example, sexual orientation.  While policyholders may want to share that 
information with friends and family, they may not want a carrier to have it.  
If, to follow through on this example, carriers cannot ask about sexual 
                                                                                                                                
91 See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 220. 
92 There is significant literature about whether these intrusions into personal 
space, or extrusions of personal information are privacy harms. It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to resolve any of these debates. Rather, at issue here is 
whether insurers using big data to classify risk implicate new or different privacy 
concerns. 
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orientation in classifying risk, they should not be able to use Facebook 
posts to identify the same information for classification purposes.  
Second, and relatedly, carriers may be able to use predictive 
analytics to discern private information that they should not otherwise have 
or use as a basis for risk classification.  For example, as described above, 
Target used shopping patterns to discern which of its customers were 
pregnant.93 It is easy to imagine an insurer using the same or similar data to 
predict pregnancies or other personal information.  Again, and without 
specifying where the boundaries are, if a carrier is prohibited from asking 
about the information in the first instance, the carrier should not be able to 
predict the same.  
 
IV.  REGULATORY RESPONSE 
 
The financial and social costs listed above suggest a regulatory 
responsibility to actively consider the ways that big data could change risk 
classification.  Big data has the potential to strip away certain reasons for 
and against risk classification.  Possibly gone are credible claims to the 
benefits of managing moral hazard and concerns about explicit harm from 
being singled out as different as a result of being a member of a suspect or 
vulnerable group.  Left are old debates.  Are low risks entitled to the 
benefits of their low-risk status?  Or, should society subsidize high-risks 
because it is, for some reason, inappropriate to saddle high-risks with the 
burdens of their status? 
Similarly, gone are old ways of protecting privacy.  Insurers may 
not need to explicitly ask questions that invade particularly private spheres.  
Instead, carriers can base decisions on a set of correlations and predictions 
that may burden particular groups more than others or may invade 
particular zones of privacy.  
Big data thus implies a move from conscious discrimination and 
explicit privacy invasions to unconscious proxies. 94  Whether and how 
regulators respond will depend on jurisdictional priorities.  Is there a will to 
protect groups impacted by higher premiums or to protect certain intimate 
information?  The answer to these questions may depend on the line of 
                                                                                                                                
93 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
94 Cf. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact 20–21 
(Oct. 19, 2014) (unpublished article), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477899 (explaining that sorting using relevant criteria in 
making decisions also can serve as proxies for class). 
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coverage and the precise group burdened or information used.  But, 
protecting these groups requires regulators to think actively about the 
harms and the remedies.  
 
A.  REGULATION OF DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT 
 
To the extent that there is any legislative or regulatory will to 
engage with these discrimination or privacy issues, big data changes the 
conversation.95 To monitor, curb, control, and eliminate these concerns, 
legislators and regulators must look at the outputs of, rather than the inputs 
to, the classification system.  That is, they can no longer—to the extent that 
they ever did—worry about whether carriers are directly grouping suspect 
classes or basing rates on other socially vulnerable characteristics.  Instead, 
in the age of big data, regulators must look at how particular classes and 
individuals are being charged and then determine whether those charges 
constitute an impermissible burden.  
Regulators must first determine whether insurers are charging 
higher premiums to particular groups or individuals with particular 
characteristics (such as characteristics that are non-causal to the potential 
loss or represent socially vulnerable groups).  This will require some 
additional legwork on the part of carriers and regulators, because insurers 
will have to determine not just who is being charged more but whether 
there are any patterns to the classes of risk.  Are, for example, African 
Americans being charged more for a particular line of coverage?  Or, are 
people without children being charged more for other lines of coverage? 
Legislators and regulators must then compare these groups and 
individuals against internal calculations about whether and how insurance 
should spread risks and in which forms.  Even if risk and loss correlate with 
suspect classes, actuarial science should not necessarily govern insurance 
rates; higher rates of loss may reflect socioeconomic realities that should 
                                                                                                                                
95 It is not at all clear that there is legislative will to engage with this, or for 
that matter, any discrimination. There is little federal oversight of discrimination 
within the insurance industry. See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 198 (listing the 
limited number of federal laws and regulations on point). State regulation of 
discrimination in insurance is highly variable across jurisdictions and across lines 
of insurance. Id. at 268. For the most part, states have not even prohibited explicit 
discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. See id. at 267 (“[L]aws 
often have little to say about the most important divisive types of discrimination: 
distinctions based on race, national origin, or religion.”). 
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not burden one group over the population.96 These calculations may differ 
across lines of insurance.  There may be certain lines of insurance that 
require additional protection against discrimination.  For example, given 
the semi-mandatory nature of homeowners insurance and the perceived 
importance of homeownership, there may be reasons to put more weight in 
the risk spreading rationale.  This may be why federal regulators have 
instituted a very rare federal overlay of anti-discrimination regulation for 
homeowners’ insurance.97 
If the state chooses to make a commitment, legislators should 
prohibit carriers from placing any extra burden on suspect classes.  This 
analysis highlights one clear fact: the regulatory response to big data in the 
risk classification sphere is going to turn on the underlying normative 
framework of the state.  When a state believes that a particular line of 
insurance is designed more to spread risk, it must be on the lookout for 
disparate impacts.98 When a state does not, it need not worry. 
 
B.  REGULATION OF PRIVACY 
 
The analysis for privacy intrusions is similar, but the prescriptions 
may be different.  First, states must determine what, if anything, constitutes 
a privacy invasion in this context.  Can carriers mine and use data 
anonymously?  Can carriers use non-anonymous data about policyholders?  
Can carriers use predictive analytics to determine characteristic about the 
carrier that were otherwise private?  
After determining what matters, regulators will face the same 
issues that others have flagged in a number of big data contexts: how to 
protect end consumers from privacy invasions and predictive analytics? 99  
To resolve these issues, regulators need a two-pronged approach.  First, 
regulators will have to audit insurers’ classification systems looking at the 
“data sets mined” by the algorithms, as well as the “source codes and 
programmers’ notes describing the variables, correlations, and inferences 
                                                                                                                                
96  See id. at 267 (“Even when actuarial support can be found for these 
assumptions, that does not mean that they are not intimately tied up with socially 
suspect characteristics.”). 
97 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013); see also supra note 83. 
98 Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 13–16 (describing how credit scores 
might have a disparate impact on racial minorities). 
99 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 2; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 2, at 95; 
Richards & King, supra note 69, at 408.  
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embedded” in the algorithm. 100  These audits should focus on whether 
personal data is appropriately scrubbed from the data used to create the 
predictions, whether carriers are gathering inappropriate individual data, 
and whether the data are suggesting inappropriate correlative predictions.  
Second, regulators may want to institute a hearing procedure for 
individuals who believe that inappropriate data are being gathered or 
used.101 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Big data may be a natural evolution in risk classification.  It makes 
sense for insurers to take advantage of new data sets and new algorithms to 
derive new correlations to risk.  After all, insurers have a number of 
incentives to refine their pricing, including the possibility of higher profits 
and better management of adverse selection.102  But, these new correlations 
may yield price discrimination that disparately impacts some suspect or 
vulnerable groups of people.  Further, the algorithms may use or divine 
information that has otherwise been entitled to some privacy protection. 
These two costs suggest a somewhat revolutionary approach to 
regulation.  First, regulators will have to actively consider whether it is 
acceptable for each line of insurance to have prices that burden suspect or 
vulnerable groups.  This will put in stark relief important choices about 
whether insurance is about risk assessment or risk spreading.103 Regulators 
will have to consider whether to protect certain groups of people from 
higher insurance prices, even if there are sound business reasons for 
carriers to charge the affected policyholders more.  To the extent that 
                                                                                                                                
100 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2 at 23.  
101 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 2, at 111; Richards & King, supra note 
69, at 426.  
102  Unless big data (a) yields correlations that make transparent the 
policyholders’ risky behavior and unless (b) that risk behavior is controllable and 
(c) has a causal relationship to the risk, there is no argument that the higher prices 
will control moral hazard. 
103 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 65 (“In short, attitudes toward 
insurance always seem to be pulling in two directions—one that highlights the 
risk-assessment or efficiency promoting features of insurance classification and the 
other that stresses the risk-distributional function of insurance.”); Baker, supra 
note 20, at 25 (“Thus, debates over the legitimacy of particular forms of risk 
classification invoke classic debates over the nature of distributive justice.”). 
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regulators want to protect these groups, the regulatory regime will have to 
change from one based on prohibiting intentional discrimination to one 
based on prohibiting the disparate impact of business decisions.104 Second, 
for both price discrimination and privacy issues, regulators will have to 
increase their capacity to analyze the data inputs, algorithms, and outputs of 
the classification schemes.  
  
                                                                                                                                
104  As discussed above, HUD has already made that determination in the 
context of claims based on the Fair Housing Act. See supra note 83. 
